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LABOR

LAW-PRESUMPTION AGAINST RULES PROHIBITING SOLICITATION
DURING NONWORKING TIME-NLRB's APPLICATION OF PRESUMPTION

IN HOSPITAL PATIENT ACCESS AREAS, EXCEPT FOR IMMEDIATE PATIENT CARE AREAS, UPHELD AS VALID.
NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc. (U.S. 1979)
Motivated in part by union organizational activity, Baptist Hospital
(Hospital), a private, nonprofit institution, promulgated a rule prohibiting
solicitation' by employees in areas of the Hospital "accessible to or utilized
by the public," such as lobbies, gift shops and cafeterias on the first floor, as
well as corridors and sitting rooms adjacent to patient rooms on upper
floors. 2 A local chapter of the Service Employees International Union
(Union) 3 filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), claiming that the Hospital's rule violated sec4
tion 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act).

1. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 775 (1979). The term "solicitation," as it is
used in the field of labor relations, refers to communications among employees and union organizers on company property. See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 123-24 (1977). For a further discussion of solicitation in the labor

law context, see notes 23-25 and accompanying text infra.
2. 442 U.S. at 775-76. The Hospital's rule governing solicitation read:
No solicitations of any kind, including solicitations for memberships or subscriptions, will
be permitted by employees at any time, including work time and non-work time in any
area of the Hospital which is accessible to or utilized by the public. Anyone who does so
will be subject to disciplinary action. In those work areas of the Hospital not accessible to
or utilized by the public, no solicitation of any kind, including solicitations for memberships or subscriptions will be permitted at any time by employees who are supposed to be
working, or in such a way as to interfere with the work of other employees who are
supposed to be working. Anyone who does so and thereby neglects his work or interferes
with the work of others will likewise be subject to disciplinary action. No distributions of
any kind, including circulars or other printed materials, shall be permitted in any work
area at any time.
Id. at 776 n.2.
3. Id. at 776. The chapter involved was Local 150-T, Service Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO, the intervenor in the instant suit. Id. at 775.
4. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 344 (1976), enforcement granted in part and denied
in part, 576 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 442 U.S.
773 (1979). Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act provides: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7 of the Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section
7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in [section
8(a)(3) of the Act].
Id. § 157.
Section 8(a)(3) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
....
Id. § 158(a)(3).

(583)
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The Hospital and the NLRB presented evidence to an administrative
law judge 5 who concluded that the Hospital's "no-solicitation" rule violated
section 8(a)(1) and was therefore invalid. 6 Agreeing with the administrative
law judge, the NLRB 7 ordered the Hospital to cease enforcing any rule
prohibiting solicitation by its employees during nonworking time in any
On appeal, the United
areas other than "immediate patient care areas."
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of the
NLRB's order, holding that the Hospital had presented sufficient evidence of
disruption of patient care to justify its broad proscription of solicitation by
employees. 9
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated
and remanded in part, holding that, while the Sixth Circuit was correct in
denying enforcement of the NLRB order as applied to corridors and sitting
rooms on patients' floors, it had erred in also denying enforcement of the
order as applied to the first-floor cafeteria, gift shop, and lobbies. NLRB v.
Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
Employees of private, nonprofit hospitals have only recently received
the express protection of the National Labor Relations Act 10 which, as originally enacted, appeared to exclude such hospitals from its coverage. 1" Despite the NLRB's determination in Matter of Central Dispensary and

5. 442 U.S. at 776-77. The Hospital presented extensive evidence by physicians and hospital administrators that the no-solicitation rule was necessary to prevent disruption of patient
care, especially in such areas as corridors and sitting rooms on upper floors of the hospital. Id.
at 782-84.
6. Id. at 777.
7. 223 N.L.R.B. at 346. Underlying the NLRB decision was a rebuttable presumption that
an employer's rule prohibiting union solicitation by employees on company property during
nonworking time is invalid except as applied to immediate patient care areas. Id. at 344 n.2.
The NLRB accepted the findings of the administrative law judge, who had concluded that the
Hospital had failed to show special circumstances necessary to rebut the presumption. Id. at
344, 355-58. For a discussion of the NLRB's presumptions concerning no-solicitation rules, see
notes 17-46 and accompanying text infra.
8. 223 N.L.R.B. at 346. The NLRB's order stated that the Hospital must cease and desist
from "[p]romulgating, maintaining in effect, enforcing, or applying any rule or regulation prohibiting its employees from soliciting on behalf of any labor organization during their nonworking time in any areas of its hospital other than immediatepatient care areas." Id. In another
part of its order, the NLRB instructed the Hospital to withdraw its existing no-solicitation rule
"to the extent that it prohibits its employees from soliciting on behalf of a labor organization
during their nonworking time in any nonworking area of the Hospital including those areas open
to the public." id. at 361.
9. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 576 F.2d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part and
vacated and remanded in part, 442 U.S. 773 (1979). The Sixth Circuit did enforce the Board's
order insofar as it related to a finding of discrimination by the Hospital against an individual
employee. 576 F.2d at 111. For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Baptist Hospital
see note 40 infra.
10. See note 16 and accompanying text infra.
11. See National Labor Relations (Wagner)Act, ch. 372, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976)). The current version of the Wagner Act includes
two major amendments: the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, §§ 1-17, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1976)); and the Landrum-Grifln Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 541 (1959) (current version at29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 164 (1976)).
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Emergency Hospital 12 that a private, nonprofit hospital's activities were governed by the Act, 13 the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 made it clear that
such hospitals were exempt. 14 In response to numerous strikes and work
stoppages by employees of such facilities,' 5 Congress amended the Act in
16
1974 to cover employees of private, nonprofit hospitals.
Before the Act was amended in 1974 to include nonprofit hospitals, the
NLRB had considered the right of employers to control the time and manner in which their employees solicited for, and were solicited by, a union on
business premises. 1 7 In an effort to provide a greater degree of certainty
and stability in union organizational activities, the NLRB developed presumptions that restricted the employers' freedom to make rules regulating
the solicitation of union membership and the distribution of union literature. 18 In its 1943 ruling in Matter of Peyton Packing, 19 for example, the
NLRB announced a rebuttable presumption that employer rules prohibiting
12. 44 N.L.R.B. 533 (1942), enforcement granted sub nom. NLRB v. Central Dispensary
and Emergency Hosp., 145 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945).
13. 44 N.L.R.B. at 542. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2, 49 Stat. 449, 450-51
(1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976)).
14. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, §§ 1-17, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-69 (1976)).
15. Farkas, The National Labor Relations Act: The Health Care Amendments, 29 LAB. L.J.
259, 259 (1978).
16. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152
(1976)). The reduction of strikes over union representation and the lessening of employee turnover in the health care industry were dual objectives of the health care amendments. Feheley,
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Health Care Institutions, 36 OHIO ST. L.J.
235, 240 (1975).
Although nonprofit hospitals were not expressly covered by the Act until 1974, proprietary
hospitals which otherwise met jurisdictional standards were consistently covered under the Act
prior to that time. ABA LABOR RELATIONS SECTION, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 4 (1976).
For a discussion of the application of no-solicitation presumptions in proprietary hospitals, see
note 26 infra.
For a discussion of NLRB jurisdictional standards under the 1974 health care amendments
to the Act, see Note, The 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act:
Jurisdictional Standards and Appropriate Bargaining Units, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 351, 354
(1977). For a discussion of the historical background of the Act as applied to the health care
industry, see Feheley, supra, at 238-40. See also Farkas, supra note 15, at 259; Twomey,
Health Care Institutions Under the National Labor Relations Act, 15 AM. Bus. L.J. 225 (1977).
17. R. GomAuN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 179 (1976). In developing case law concerning
solicitation, the NLRB and the courts have attempted to accommodate the employees' interest
in maximum access to union communications with the employer's interest in maintaining efficiency in his operations and providing for the security of his property. Id. Although the National. Labor Relations Act outlaws interference by the employer with concerted employee union
activities, this has not been interpreted to bar the employer from imposing some limits upon
the time and manner in which employees may solicit for, or be solicited by, a union. Id. The
limits imposed must be designed and intended not to limit significantly employee rights, but
rather, to provide protection for legitimate employer interests. Feheley, supra note 16, at 292.
18. See Feheley, supra note 16, at 291. These NLRB presumptions are based on factual
distinctions underlying the organizational activity in question: e.g., the time and place of the
activity, the identity of organizers (employees or outside organizers), the degree of interference
with production, plant discipline or cleanliness, and the nature of the activity (oral solicitation or
distribution of written material). Id. It should be noted that company rules concerning the
distribution of written material (as opposed to oral solicitation) have been upheld for the following reasons: 1) the distribution of leaflets could create litter and become a safety hazard; and 2)
the locus of distribution of written material is not as important as it is in the case of oral
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union solicitation on company property during nonworking time are invalid,
absent evidence from the employer that special circumstances make the rule
necessary to maintain production or discipline. 20 The validity of this presumption concerning employers' "broad" no-solicitation rules was soon upheld by the Supreme Court in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB ,21 where
the Court stated that the adoption of such a presumption was within the
22
NLRB's authority under the Act.
The NLRB's presumption against broad no-solicitation rules evolved in
the industrial setting as the Board attempted to balance the interests of
employers and employees. 23 When confronted with such rules in the context of retail establishments and public restaurants, the NLRB recognized
that the interests of these employers in preventing employee solicitation

solicitation because the employee may take written material with him to read at his leisure. R.
GORMAN, supra note 17, at 181. See Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). For a
discussion of the employer's right to restrict solicitation by nonemployees, see NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
19. 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943). In Peyton Packing, the management of a meat-packing plant
promulgated a rule prohibiting solicitation of any kind by employees while on company property
or during working hours. Id. at 832.
20. Id. at 843-44. The NLRB stated that, although an employee is on company property, he
is free to use his nonworking time as he wishes without unreasonable restraint. Id. at 843. To
insure this freedom, the NLRB held that an employer's rule prohibiting solicitation during
nonworking time is presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to the employee's right of
self-organization. Id. at 843-44. In permitting the presumption to be rebutted by evidence of
special circumstances, the NLRB has recognized that some situations present unique needs and
considerations. Feheley, supra note 16, at 291. The presumption has been overcome by specific
proof of a necessity for efficiency, safety, or discipline. R. GORMAN, supra note 17, at 181,
citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1973) (national security
justifies restricting off-duty employees to parking lots and other nonworking areas when
employer is engaged in production of military and classified aircraft and spacecraft).
21. 324 U.S. 793 (1945). In Republic Aviation, the employer, a large military aircraft manufacturer, had adopted a rule prohibiting solicitation in its factory. Id. at 794-95. An employee
who persisted in soliciting union membership during lunch breaks was terminated after being
warned to stop. Id. at 795. The NLRB determined that the employer's no-solicitation rule
violated § 8(a)(1) because it interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in violation of §
7 of the Act, and discriminated against the discharged employee in violation of § 8(a)(3). Id. at
795-96. For the pertinent parts of §§ 7, 8(a)(1), and 8(a)(3), see note 4 supra.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit which had upheld the
decision of the NLRB. 324 U.S. at 805. In so doing, the Court stressed that the employee's
right to organize must be balanced against the property rights of the employer. Id. at 797-98.
The Court stated:
[The NLRB has the responsibility of adjusting] the undisputed right of self-organization
assured to employees tinder the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of
employers to maintain discipline in their establishments. Like so many others, these
rights are not unlimited in the sense that they can be exercised without regard to any
duty which the existence of rights in others may place upon employer or employee. Opportunity to organize and proper discipline are both essential elements in a balanced
society.
Id.
22. 324 U.S. at 804. The Court stressed that the validity of an NLRB presumption, like a
statutory presumption or one established by regulation, depends upon the "rationality between
what is proved and what is inferred." Id. at 804-05. Since broad no-solicitation rules impermissibly interfere with employees' organizational rights under the Act, the Court found that the
NLRB's presumption against such rules was rationally based and therefore valid. Id.at 802-03.
23. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 510 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
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were different from those of industrial employers and, thus, the Board refrained from mechanically applying its presumption. 24 Rather, the NLRB
concluded that no-solicitation rules in these establishments were reasonable
in view of 1) the extent of the public's presence in such settings; 2) the
relationship between the public and the employees; and 3) the fact that the
primary business of these employers (direct sales to customers) would be
25
disrupted by solicitation.
After private, nonprofit hospitals were brought within the Act's jurisdiction, the issue arose whether the NLRB's presumption against the validity of
broad no-solicitation rules should be extended to cover these hospitals. 26 In
St. John's Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc., 27 the NLRB announced that
the presumption would apply to nonprofit hospitals but carved out a limited
exception allowing employers to ban solicitation in "strictly patient care
areas." 28 Distinguishing "strictly patient care areas" from "patient access
areas," 29 the Board reasoned that since solicitation in the former areas might
be "unsettling" to patients, a rule prohibiting solicitation in those areas
24. Id.at 493; id. at 511 (Powell, J., concurring). See Marriott Corp. (Children's Inn), 223
N.L.R.B. 978 (1976); May Dep't Stores, 59 N.L,..B. 976 (1944), modified, 154 F.2d 533 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725 (1946).
25. 437 U.S. at 512 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell explained that rather than viewing cases involving retail establishments as situations where the NLRB chose not to apply the
no-solicitation presumption at all, they might be viewed alternatively as instances in which the
NLRB presumption had been applied but was rebutted by the employer's showing of special
circumstances. Id. at 512 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). Nonetheless, Justice Powell stressed that
the result under either view would be the same because, after special circumstances are shown,
the NLRB will balance the employees' rights against the employer's interests and the outcome,
besides deciding the case at bar, will serve as precedent for all cases involving retail establishments thereafter. Id.
26. Feheley, supra note 16, at 295-96. It should be noted that, in the context of proprietary
hospitals, the NLRB had applied its presumption against the validity of no-solicitation rules. See
Bellaire Gen. Hosp., 203 N.L.R.B. 1105, 1111 (1973); Guyan Valley Hosp., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B.
107, 111 (1972); Summit Nursing and Convalescent Home, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 769, 769-70
(1972), enforcement denied, 472 F.2d 1380 (6th Cir. 1973). In Summit, the NLRB concluded
that the facility had failed to show special circumstances to rebut the presumption. 196
N.L.R.B. at 769-70. In Guyan Valley, the Board held that the presumption against the validity
of no-solicitation rules was overcome because the rule applied to patient access areas where the
potential for disruption to patients made the hospital's right to ban solicitation "akin to that of
retail department stores." 198 N.L.R.B. at 111. For a discussion of the presumption as applied
in the context of retail stores, see notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
In Bellaire, the NLRB did not directly mention the presumption, but affirmed the
administrative law judge's order that the hospital revoke its existing broad no-solicitation rule to
permit solicitation, except in those areas where the hospital could establish necessity for the
rule to maintain production, discipline, or security. 203 N.L.R.B. at 1111.
27. 222 N.L.R.B. 1150 (1976), enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 557 F.2d
1368 (10th Cir. 1977). The hospital in St. John's had promulgated a broad no-solicitation rule
prohibiting, inter alia, solicitation by employees except during nonworking time and in nonworking areas to which patients and visitors did not have access. 222 N.L.R.B. at 1150.
28. 222 N.L.R.B. at 1150-51. Recognizing that a tranquil atmosphere is necessary for quality
patient care, the Board found that hospitals have a special interest which may justify more
stringent control of employee solicition. Id. at 1150. The NLRB defined "strictly patient care
areas" to include "the patients' rooms, operating rooms, and places where patients receive
treatment, such as x-ray and therapy areas." Id.
29. Id. at 1151. The NLRB defined "patient access areas" to include "cafeterias, lounges,
and the like." Id.
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would not be presumed illegal. 30 The NLRB found, however, that because
solicitation in "patient access areas" would not have an adverse effect on
patients, a no-solicitation rule pertaining to those areas would be presumed
unlawful. 3 ' The Board thus balanced the interests of patients well enough
to frequent the patient access areas against those of the hospital employees
and concluded that the interests of patients in a tranquil environment 3did
2
not outweigh the interests of employees in soliciting union representation.
The United States Courts of Appeals which considered the validity of
the NLRB's presumption as it concerned patient access areas in hospitals
applied varied rationales and achieved conflicting results, 33 with some courts
questioning whether the presumption was applicable to the hospital setting
at all. 34 In analyzing the applicability and validity of the presumption, the
courts divided the patient access areas into two subdivisions: 1) patient access areas adjacent to strictly patient care areas, such as corridors and sitting
rooms on patient floors; and 2) all other patient access areas including
cafeterias, gift shops, and coffee shops. 35 The Seventh Circuit enforced an
NLRB order which protected solicitation both in patient access areas adjacent to patient rooms as well as in cafeterias and lounges.36 The First Circuit enforced an NLRB order which focused solely on cafeterias and coffee
shops and protected solicitation in those areas only. 3 7 On the other hand,
30. Id. at 1150.
31. Id. at 1150-51.
32. Id. at 1151. With respect to visitor access areas other than those involved ill patient
care, the NLRB found that the possibility of disruption of patients caused by solicitation was
remote. Id, Thus, the presumption against the broad no-solicitation rule was deemed to be
applicable in those areas. Id.
33. See Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 351, 354-58 (D.C. Cir.), vacated
in part and remanded, 439 U.S. 9 (1978); NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 576 F.2d 107, 110 (6th
Cir. 1978), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 442 U.S. 773 (1979); Lutheran
Hosp. of Milwaukee, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 208, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 438 U.S. 902 (1978); St. John's Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d
1368, 1372-75 (10th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), aff'd,
437 U.S. 483 (1978).
34. See Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part
and remanded, 439 U.S. 9 (1978); NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 576 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1978),
aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 442 U.S. 773 (1979); St. John's Hosp. and
School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977).
35. See Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 351, 354-59 (D.C. Cir.), vacated
in part and remanded, 439 U.S. 9 (1978); NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 576 F.2d 107, 109-10
(6th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 442 U.S. 773 (1979); Lutheran
Hosp. of Milwaukee, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 208, 212-16 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 438 U.S. 902 (1978); St. John's Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d
1368, 1371-76 (10th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d 477, 478-82 (1st Cir.
1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
36. Lutheran Hosp. of Milwaukee, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated
and remanded, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). In Lutheran Hospital, the Seventh Circuit enforced an
NLRB order which applied the presumption to all areas except "immediate patient care areas,"
terming the Board's application of the presumption "logical and just." 564 F.2d at 215-16. The
court further found that the factors which make solicitation undesirable in strictly patient care
areas are not present in cafeterias and lounges, because employees in those areas are generally
not acting in their professional capacities. Id. at 215.
37. NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 544 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 483 (1978). In
Beth Israel, the First Circuit affirmed the NLRB's finding that the hospital had failed to rebut
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the Tenth, 38 District of Columbia, 39 and Sixth Circuits 4 0 denied enforcement to similar NLRB orders which attempted to protect solicitation both in
areas adjacent to patient rooms and in cafeterias and shops.
Prompted by the divergent views among the circuits, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB. 41 The hospital in
that case challenged the extension of the no-solicitation presumption to hos-

the Board's presumption against the validity of no-solicitation rules. 554 F.2d at 480. The court
cautioned, however, that the NLRB should revise its presumption as applied to hospitals if
future experience shows that patient well-being is jeopardized by solicitation in these areas. Id.
at 481.
38. St. John's Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977).
For a discussion of the NLRB's decision in this case, see notes 27-32 and accompanying text
supra. The Tenth Circuit criticized the NLRB's application of the presumption against nosolicitation rules to nonprofit hospitals for the following reasons: 1) the distinction between
strictly patient care areas and other areas was unsupported by the record; 2) the NLRB based
its conclusion on findings outside its area of expertise; 3) the application of the presumption was
unreasonable; and 4) the application of the presumption was contrary to the intent of Congress.
557 F.2d at 1372-75. Although not expressly holding that the presumption should be inapplicable to all patient access areas, the Tenth Circuit appeared to favor this position, stating that
recognition of the unsettling effects of solicitation on patients established a special circumstance
making at least some restrictions by hospitals on solicitation necessary to maintain efficient and
orderly operations. Id. at 1375.
The court further noted that even if the presumption is applicable in the hospital setting,
the NLRB's definition of strictly patient care areas must be interpreted to include such areas as
halls, stairways, elevators, and waiting rooms accessible to hospital patients. Id. at 1375.
In an alternative holding, the court held that with respect to gift shops and cafeterias, the
hospital maintains the same commercial interest as the management of a retail store or restaurant and thus retains the right to prohibit solicitation in those areas. Id. The court stated that
since the hospital unquestionably could ban solicitation in such areas if they were located outside the hospital, it did not lose that right simply because they were part of a hospital rather
than a shopping center. Id.
39. Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part and
remanded, 439 U.S. 9 (1978). In denying enforcement to the NLRB order which permitted
solicitation in the cafeteria and vending rooms, the court agreed with the alternative holding of
the Tenth Circuit in St. John's, see note 38 supra, and found these areas to be similar to other
commercial restaurants and shops where the no-solicitation presumption was considered by the
NLRB to be inapplicable. 578 F.2d at 357. For a discussion of the presumption's inapplicability
to retail shops and restaurants, see notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra. Concerning the
hospital's corridors, the court concluded that there was no substantial evidence supporting the
NLRB's conclusion that corridors were not entitled to the same protection as strictly patient
care areas. 578 F.2d at 356. The court viewed the hospital as having special interests which
justify a broad no-solicitation rule in corridors as well as strictly patient care areas. Id.
40. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 576 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part and vacated
and remanded in part, 442 U.S. 773 (1979). The Sixth Circuit in Baptist Hospital concluded
that the Hospital had met its burden of showing that special circumstances justified its broad
prohibition against solicitation in all patient access areas. 576 F.2d at 110. For the text of the
rule promulgated by the Hospital in Baptist Hospital, see note 2 supra. Three witnesses (two
physicians and a hospital administrator) had emphasized that many seriously ill patients are
permitted to move through the public areas of the Hospital, including lobbies, lounges, and the
cafeteria. 576 F.2d at 109. The witnesses repeatedly stressed the necessity for a tranquil atmosphere throughout the hospital, drawing no distinction between strictly patient care areas and
other patient access areas. Id. at 109-10. In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit also relied
upon congressional concern for the special circumstances of hospitals, as shown by the legislative history to the 1974 health care amendments to the Act. Id. at 110. See S. Rep. No. 93-766,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3946, 3951.

41. 437 U.S. 483, 489 (1978). For a brief discussion of the decision of the court of appeals in
Beth Israel, see note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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pitals on four grounds: 1) that the NLRB's decision to extend the presumption to nonprofit hospitals conflicts with the congressional policy of insuring
that organizational activity does not disrupt patient care; 2) that the application of the principle of limited judicial review of NLRB action is inapposite
in the hospital context because the Board is acting outside its area of expertise; 3) that the NLRB's decision to apply the presumption to nonprofit hospitals is unsupported by evidence and is irrational; and 4) that it is irrational
to apply the presumption to a hospital cafeteria while refusing to apply it to
public restaurants. 42 The Court rejected these arguments, 43 holding that
the Act is not violated by the NLRB's approach of requiring a health-care
facility to permit employee solicitation where the facility has not justified a
prohibition as necessary to avoid disruption of health-care operations or disturbance of patients. 4 4 In addition, the Court upheld the appellate court's
decision that the NLRB had properly applied the presumption to this hospi45
tal's cafeteria.
Although the dispute in Beth Israel centered on prohibitions concerning
facilities used almost entirely by staff-as opposed to other patient access
areas such as corridors and lounges on patient floors-concurring opinions
expressed fear that Beth Israel might provide an example which would lead

42. 437 U.S. at 495-96.
43. Id. at 496-508. Concerning the petitioner-hospital's first argument, the Court stated that
nothing in the legislative history to the 1974 amendments conflicts with the NLRB's general
approach to enforcement of the employees' right to organize under the Act. Id. at 496. In light
of the express findings of Congress that the right to organize would improve health care and
that unionism was necessary to overcome poor working conditions which retard the delivery of
quality health care, the Court could not say that the NLRB presumption as applied to hospitals
was an impermissible construction of the Act. Id. at 499-500.
The petitioner's argument concerning limited judicial review of NLRB action, especially
concerning the Board's authority to fashion generalized rules for hospitals, was rejected on the
ground that Congress had conferred the authority to develop and apply fundamental national
labor policy on the NLRB and in furtherance of this objective, the Board must be allowed to
make rules. Id. at 500-01. In addition, although the NLRB's expertise is not delivery of health
care services, it is expert in national labor policy and it is in the Board, not in hospitals, that the
1974 amendments vested responsibility for developing that policy in the health-care industry.
Id. at 501. Thus, the Court concluded that since judicial review in this context is narrow, a rule
adopted by the NLRB is subject to judicial review for consistency with the Act and for rationality, but if those criteria are satisfied, the NLRB's application of the rule must be enforced if
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Id.
Concerning the petitioner's third argument, the Court reviewed the evidence before the
NLRB and concluded that the inference drawn from the facts presented regarding the likelihood
of disruption of patient care could not fairly be termed irrational. Id. at 504.
The Court also rejected the petitioner's final argument based upon the similarity between a
retail establishment or a public restaurant and a hospital cafeteria or gift shop. Id. at 506. The
Court stated that such an analogy wholly failed to consider that the NLRB in each situation
concluded that its rules struck the appropriate balance between union organizational rights and
employer rights in the particular industry. Id. After considering the primary function of the
cafeteria (to serve employees), the availability of alternate areas for solicitation, and the remoteness of interference with patient care, the Court was unable to conclude that it was irrational to
strike the balance in favor of solicitation in the hospital cafeteria and against solicitation in
public restaurants. Id. at 506-07.
44. Id. at 507.
45. Id.
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courts "further down the open-solicitation road than they would have done,
46
had a more usual case been the first one to come here."
Against this background, the Baptist Hospital Court began its analysis
by noting that the NLRB's presumption as applied to nonprofit hospitals
"does no more than place on the hospital the burden of proving, with respect to . .. [all areas other than immediate patient care areas], that union

solicitation may adversely affect patients." 47 The Court then reviewed the
holding of the Sixth Circuit that the Hospital had presented sufficient evidence of the ill effects of solicitation to fully justify its broad no-solicitation
rule.

48

46. Id. at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In another concurring opinion, Justice Powell,
joined by Chief justice Burger and Justice Rehoquist, insisted that the presumption against
no-solicitation rules is inapplicable in the hospital context. Id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
justice Powell distinguished the hospital setting in which patients are present from the traditional industrial setting in which the presumption was formulated and where third parties unconnected with labor or management are generally not involved. Id. According to Justice Powell, the validity of the presumption in traditional settings cannot automatically be transferred to
other work settings, for to do so would be to sever the connection between the inference
contained in the presumption and its underlying basis. I. at 511. (Powell, J.,concurring). In
addition, Justice Powell analogized the hospital setting to that of the retail establishment in
which the NLRB has determined that the presumption against no-solicitation rules is invalid.
Id. at 512-13 (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion of the NLRB's rationale in removing
retail establishments from the scope of the presumption, see notes 24-25 and accompanying text
supra. In Justice Powell's view, as articulated in this concurring opinion, the presence of patients and the public in a hospital cafeteria should remove such a case from the scope of the
presumption, just as the presence of customers renders the presumption inapplicable in retail
establishment cases. Id. at 513 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell found the hospital's function in serving patients and their families to be analogous to the retail establishment's function
of serving customers and did not distinguish between the two settings on the basis of the
presence or absence of a profit motive. Id.
It was Justice Powell who later delivered the majority opinion in Baptist Hospital, where
he withdrew from the strong stance taken in Beth Israel against application of the Board's
no-solicitation presumption. 442 U.S. at 775-91. In Baptist Hospital, Justice Powell never mentioned the analogy he had drawn in Beth Israel between the hospital setting and retail establishments for no-solicitation purposes. See id; note 84 infra.
47. 442 U.S. at 781. The Court explained that in applying the presumption to hospitals, the
definition of "immediate patient care areas" is crucial because, outside those areas, the
employer has the burden of proof in proving that solicitation adversely affects patient care. Id,
at 780. (It should be noted that the phrase "immediate patient care areas" is used synonymously
with "strictly patient care areas" by the courts. For a discussion of these areas, see notes 27-31
and accompanying text supra.) In the present case, neither the administrative law judge nor the
NLRB defined the phrase "immediate patient care areas." 442 U.S. at 780. The Board did,
however, expressly base its ruling on the analysis in St. John's. 223 N.L.R.B. at 344 n.2. For a
discussion of St. John's, see notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra. Since St. John's set forth
the NLRB's standard of application for the no-solicitation presumption as applied to hospitals
and enumerated patient rooms, operating rooms, and treatment rooms as areas in which the
employer would be allowed to ban solicitation, the Supreme Court concluded that this definition was the one utilized by the NLRB in Baptist Hospital. 442 U.S. at 780, citing St. John's
Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B.at 1150. The NLRB has never published a
more inclusive list of "strictly" or "immediate" patient care areas, but nothing in NLRB opinions after St. John's indicates that the Board views areas other than those enumerated to be
included within the scope of these terms. 442 U.S. at 781 i1.10.
48. 442 U.S. at 782-91. The Court considered the evidentiary support in the record from
which the Sixth Circuit concluded that the NLRB lacked a basis for its sweeping protection of
solicitation outside immediate patient care areas. Id.The Sixth Circuit had given great weight
to the testimony of witnesses as to the necessity for a tranquil atmosphere throughout the
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Aflrming the portion of the Sixth Circuit's opinion which considered
the corridors and sitting rooms on patient floors, the Supreme Court found
"that there was no substantial evidence of record to support the Board's
holding." 49 The Court emphasized the high degree of mobility of even critically ill patients in modern hospitals and the availability of alternate locations where solicitation is permitted. 5"
On the other hand, the Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's appraisal of the evidence concerning the cafeteria, gift shops, and lobbies located
ori the first floor, concluding that the evidence presented by the Hospital
was insufficient to rebut the NLRB's presumption that the needs of essential
patient care do not require the banning of solicitation in those areas. 5 1 The
Court pointed to an absence of evidence concerning the frequency of patient
use of such places 52 and to testimony by Hospital witnesses who speculated
that at least some kinds of solicitation in those areas would be unlikely to
have a significant impact on patient care. 5 3 The portion of the Sixth Circuit's opinion concerning the cafeteria, gift shops, and lobbies on the first
54
floor was therefore vacated and remanded.
The Court then turned its attention to the more general issue of
whether the NLRB's presumption should be applied in the hospital setting
at all. 55 The Sixth Circuit had, in effect, concluded that the NLRB's presumption was irrational as applied to hospitals and that the Board should be
required to prove that solicitation in any given patient access area will not
interfere with patient care. 56 After reviewing the necessity for a sound fac-

hospital in order to protect the well-being of patients, and had applied this testimony to all
patient access areas. Id. at 783.
49. Id. at 785-86. The Court noted that patients often move through corridors adjacent to
their rooms on route to treatment or as part of their convalescence. Id. at 784. The Court
further observed that the sitting rooms allow for patients to visit with family and friends, and
often are used by physicians in conferring with the families of patients-frequently in times of
crisis. Id. For further discussion of the testimony of the Hospital's witnesses, see note 78 infra.
50. 442 U.S. at 784-85. The Hospital had presented evidence that other areas were available
for solicitation under the Hospital's rule, including twenty-six nurses' stations and adjoining
utility rooms, two employee lounges, and the maintenance and laundry buildings. Id. The
Court explained that the availability of alternative locations for solicitation was not dispositive,
although such a fact did lend support for the Hospital's ban on solicitation in other areas. id. at
785, citing Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at 505.
51. 442 U.S. at 786-87.
52. Id. at 786. The Court observed that a patient in Baptist Hospital must have special
permission to leave the floor on which his room is located and to eat meals in the cafeteria. Id.
It thus appeared to the Court that the first floor is only visited by some patients and then only
occasionally. Id. The Court concluded that patients who do visit the first floor are judged fit to
withstand the activities in those areas. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 790-91.
55. Id. at 787-90.
56. Id. at 787. The Sixth Circuit never rejected the application of the presumption expressly, but stated that there was no evidence in the case to justify an "immediate patient care"
area limitation on the no-solicitation rule and that "in the setting of a modern general hospital it
is difficult to define the areas of immediate patient care." 576 F.2d at 110. The Supreme Court
characterized this analysis as a rejection of the presumption as applied to hospitals on the
ground of irrationality. 442 U.S. at 787.
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tual connection between proven and inferred facts in order for a Board presumption to be valid, 57 the Supreme Court nevertheless could not conclude
that application of the presumption to hospitals was irrational in all respects,
since experience in Beth Israel Hospital and Baptist Hospital made clear
that solicitation in at least some public areas of a hospital will not adversely
affect patients or patient care. 58 The Court pointed out, however, that the
evidence of record on this and similar cases "casts serious doubt on a presumption as to hospitals so sweeping that it embraces solicitation in the corridors and sitting rooms on floors occupied by patients," 5 9 especially since
every hospital making the attempt has overcome the Board's presumption as
applied to such corridors and sitting rooms. 60 Because the evidence presented by the Hospital in Baptist Hospital was sufficient to rebut the presumption as applied to these areas, the Court did not need to decide the
rationality of this portion of the presumption nor to frame the limits of an
appropriate presumption as applied to hospitals.61
The Court did nevertheless express doubts over whether the NLRB's
interpretation of its present presumption adequately takes into account the
medical practices and methods of treatment incident to the delivery of patient care in a modem hospital. 62 Thus, the Court repeated its admonition

57. 442 U.S. at 787, citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. at 804-05. For a
discussion of Republic Aviation, see notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
58. 442 U.S. at 787-88.
59. Id. at 788.
60. Id. The Court noted the evidence in the present case and cited the extensive evidence
presented in Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part
and remanded, 439 U.S. 9 (1978). The Court noted that congestion in corridors impedes the
operation of medical staff and equipment which often need to be moved quickly in response to
emergencies. 442 U.S. at 788, citing 578 F.2d at 355-56. The corridors also serve as storage
areas for emergency equipment, viewing rooms for the hospital nursery, locations for physical
therapy, and, in many departments, as the only "waiting room" available. 442 U.S. at 788. For
a brief discussion of Baylor, see note 39 supra.
The Court also cited the opinion of the Tenth Circuit in St. John's, where the court concluded that the NLRB presumption (first adapted to the hospital setting in St. John's) was
unsupported by evidence that solicitation in such areas would not adversely effect patient care.
442 U.S. at 788-89, citing St. John's Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1375. The
Tenth Circuit concluded that in order to preserve the NLRB's presumption in the hospital
context, the Board's definition of "immediate" or "strictly" patient care areas must be interpreted to include halls, stairways, elevators, and waiting rooms accessible to patients. 557 F.2d
at 1375. For a discussion of St. John's, see notes 27-32 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
61. 442 U.S. at 789. The Court pointed out that the development of such presumptions is
normally the function of the NLRB. Id. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra; notes
72-73 and accompanying text infra.
62. 442 U.S. at 789. The Court noted that, in reviewing the scope and application of its
presumption, the NLRB should take into account that modern hospitals house "a complex array
of facilities and techniques for patient care and therapy that defy simple classification." Id. at
789-90 n.16. Since patients are cared for in a variety of settings including sitting rooms and
corridors, the use and physical layout of such areas in different hospitals may necessitate varying
resolutions of questions concerning solicitation prohibitions. Id. Similarly, the NLRB should
recognize that some cafeterias and coffee-shops may be primarily patient and patient-relative
oriented, despite the presence of employees. Id. The Court pointed out that even the Union,
and other labor organizations in cases similar to Baptist Hospital, had urged the NLRB to
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in Beth Israel that hospitals carry on a public function of utmost seriousness
and importance and that the NLRB should stand ready to revise its rulings if
future experience shows that the well-being of patients is in fact jeopar63
dized.
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun emphasized that due to
the substantial factual differences which exist among hospitals, "what may be
true of one hospital's gift shop and cafeteria may not be true of
another's." 6 4 Justice Blackmun also noted his difficulty in reconciling the
Board's ruling that solicitation is inappropriate in a retail establishment with
65
its contrary presumption concerning hospital cafeterias and gift shops.
Justice Burger concurred only in the judgment, finding that "it is wholly
irrational for the Board to create a presumption that removes from the hospital absolute authority to control all activity in areas devoted primarily to
patient care, including all areas frequented by patients." 66 Presenting an
alternative rationale for the majority's conclusion, the Chief Justice stated
that he would decide such cases on the following grounds: "(1) The Board's
presumption is wholly invalid as applied to areas of a hospital devoted
primarily to the care of patients; (2) Once the Board's order is deprived of
the support of the presumption it must be scrutinized to determine if it is
supported by independent substantial evidence." 67 Utilizing this approach
to consider the evidence on the record, Chief Justice Burger concluded that
the decision of the NLRB was not supported by substantial evidence with
respect to public areas above the first floor. 68 The Chief Justice, however,
upheld the Board's order as applied to the first floor gift shop and cafeteria
because evidence showed that these areas were not primarily patient care
69
areas.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, concurred in
the judgment, asserting that the Sixth Circuit had " 'misapprehended or
grossly misapplied' the substantial evidence rule with respect to the
cafeteria, gift shop, and first floor lobbies of Baptist Hospital." 71 Justice
Brennan disagreed, however, with the majority's more general discussion
concerning application of the Board's presumption to corridors and sitting
abandon the simplistic "immediate patient care area" criterion and to concentrate more, instead,
on framing its rules with careful attention to the wide variety of activities within today's hospitals. Id.
63. Id. at 790, citing Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at 508.
64. 442 U.S. at 791 (Blackmnn, J., concurring).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 791-92 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
67. Id. at 792 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger cited Beth Israel as consistent
with this approach since the Court in that case stressed the necessity for a continuing development and possible revision of the NLRB's approach to hospital solicitation. Id., citing Beth
Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at 507-08. Moreover, the Chief Justice stressed that in Beth
Israel, the majority had explained that the cafeteria in question was not primarity a patient care
area. 442 U.S. at 792 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
68. 442 U.S. at 792-93 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
69. Id. at 793 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
70. Id. at 795 (Brennan, J., concurring), quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at
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rooms on patient floors. 7 1 He stressed that decisions in the health-care area
are no exception to the rule that the development of presumptions is normally a function of the NLRB, and that its conclusions on these matters are
traditionally given considerable deference by the courts. 72 Since Justice
Brennan believed that the NLRB has shown itself to be sensitive to differences between the hospital and the industrial work place, he saw no need to
second-guess the Board's handling of this delicate area of labor-management
relations.73

In considering the Baptist Hospital decision, it is submitted that the
Court was correct in supporting that portion of the Sixth Circuit's opinion
concerning corridors and sitting rooms which held that the NLRB had erred
in assessing the Hospital's evidence as insufficient to rebut the presUmlption. 74 The evidence provided "detailed illustration" of the need for a
no-solicitation rule in those areas. 75 Moreover, nothing in the evidence
provided any basis for the NLRB to doubt the accuracy of the Hospital's
witnesses who testified that union solicitation within the presence or hearing
76
of patients may have adverse effects on their recovery.
Reviewing the Sixth Circuit's determination that the NLRB had also
erred in finding that the Hospital had not rebutted the presumption for the
first floor cafeteria, gift shop, and lobbies, it is suggested that the evidence
was more difficult to evaluate and some weaknesses in the Supreme Court's
reasoning are discernible. 77 The Hospital's witnesses, in their testimony of
the need for a tranquil atmosphere, did not distinguish between the areas on
upper floors and those on the first floor.78 Upon viewing the evidence as a
whole, however, the Court found this testimony insufficient to rebut the
presumption for first floor areas, and suggested that specific evidence concerning the extent of patient use of cafeterias, gift shops, and lobbies might

71. 442 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan emphasized that neither he
nor the majority rejected the legality of the presumption applied by the NLRB. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 797 (Brennan, J., concurring).
74. See id.
at 785-86.
75. Id. at 784. The Court focused on that part of the evidence which explained the movement of critically ill patients through the corridors, the increased emphasis in modern hospitals
on patient mobility as an aspect of therapy, and the role of sitting rooms and corridors as places
for patients to visit with family and friends and for physicians to confer with patients' families
during times of crisis. Id. See note 49 supra.
76. 442 U.S. at 784. The witnesses testified that if a discussion in the course of solicitation
were to become volatile or hostile, it could "definitely have the potential for adversely affecting
the patient and the patient's family." 223 N.L.R.B. at 356.
77. See 442 U.S. at 786-87.
78. 576 F.2d at 109-10. One witness testified, however, that many patients, especially those
who are ambulatory and whose small children are not permitted to visit them in their rooms,
frequently travel to public places of the Hospital such as the corridors, the gift shop, and the
cafeteria. 223 N.L.R.B. at 356. Two of the Hospital's surgeons stressed that the psychological
factor involved in the recovery process makes it necessary to keep patients and their families as
calm as possible. Id. This necessity for tranquility in the hospital setting extends even to the
presurgery period during which a trauma to patients, who are ambulatory and given free access
to all public areas of the hospital, may have a marked effect on the success of the surgery and
the patients' recovery thereafter. Id.
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be helpful in rebutting the presumption. 79 It is submitted that, while such
evidence would not be unduly burdensome for a hospital to produce, the
Court has provided no clue as to how high the percentage of patient use
must be in order to rebut the presumption, nor has it indicated whether a
high percentage of patient use would be enough, without more, to rebut. 80
Furthermore, when considering the Sixth Circuit's decision concerning
corridors and sitting rooms on patient floors, the Court found that the
availability of alternative locations for union solicitation lent validity to the
Hospital's ban on solicitation. 8 1 The Court, however, did not mention this
factor in its consideration of the ban with respect to first floor areas.8 2 It is
suggested that the availability of alternative nonpatient areas for union solicitation which would allow access to 100% of the employees should be of
substantial significance in assessing the validity of a hospital's ban on solicitation in all patient access areas, not just on patient floors. It is contended that
in applying the presumption and balancing the needs of the parties involved
in the hospital setting- patient, employer, and employee-the NLRB
should recognize that, while the ability of the employee to communicate
with union organizers in other areas decreases the need for such communication in patient access areas, the need of both the patient and the hospital for
tranquility in such places remains strong.8 3 Thus, it is submitted that evidence of adequate alternative areas for employee solicitation should tip the
balance of interests in favor of the patients' need for tranquility and the
hospital's need for a broad no-solicitation rule in all patient access areas,
thereby rebutting the no-solicitation presumption.
It is further submitted that the Court's more general analysis upholding
the authority of the NLRB to apply its presumption against the validity of
no-solicitation rules to hospitals 84 paid too little attention to some important
79. 442 U.S. at 786.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 785. For a list of the available alternative locations, see note 50 supra.
82. See 442 U.S. at 786-87.
83. For testimony of expert witnesses concerning the patients' need for tranquility, see
NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 576 F.2d at 108-10.
84. 442 U.S. at 787-88. It should be noted that the majority opinion in Baptist Hospital,
written by Justice Powell, never addressed the issue of the Board's inconsistent application of
the presumption when dealing with retail establishments as opposed to hospital cafeterias and
gift shops. See id. at 775-91. For a discussion of the disparate treatment accorded retail establishments by the NLRB, see notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra. This unexplained omission is especially troublesome because Justice Powell, concurring in Beth Israel, had termed
this disparate application "unrealistic". 437 U.S. at 517 (Powell, J., concurring). See also note 46
supra. In Beth Israel, the NLRB explained the distinction in application of its presumption as
being based on the different primary purposes of retail establishment employees versus hospital
employees, and the Supreme Court accepted this explanation as "not irrational." 437 U.S. at
506-07. Justice Blackmun, concurring in Baptist Hospital, explained that he continues to have
difficulty perceiving a meaningful distinction which would justify treating the retail and hospital
cafeteria or gift shop situations differently. 442 U.S. at 791 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See text
accompanying note 65 supra. It is submitted that the issue of disparate treatment in these
analogous settings, which was not entirely disposed of in Beth Israel, has been further clouded
by the Supreme Court's failure to address the question in Baptist Hospital. For a discussion of
Beth Israel, see notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra.
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weaknesses in the Board's present position. NLRB presumptions are valid
only if there is "rationality between what is proved and what is inferred." 8 5
It is suggested that the presumption as applied in the hospital context lacks
the underlying degree of rationality necessary for its support. The presumption infers that only those patients in "immediate patient care areas" need
protection from the disruptive effects of union solicitation.8 6 It is submitted
that such an inference ignores the realities of modern health care in that
today's hospital patients are not usually confined to their rooms or treatment
areas 8 7 and therefore are in need of a tranquil atmosphere throughout their
entire milieu, which includes the halls, stairways, elevators, and waiting
rooms. Moreover, the related inference that any patient given permission to
frequent first floor areas has been adjudged able to withstand union solicitation also lacks factual support, since a patient's physical and emotional wellbeing are not always related to his or her capacity for ambulation and diversion in first floor areas. 88
It is further suggested that the irrationality of the presumption is evidenced in part by the ease with which it has been rebutted in the instant
suit 8 9 and in other cases dealing with corridors and sitting rooms. 90 The
85. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. at 804-05. For a discussion of Republic
Aviation, see notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
86. See St. John's Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1372. The court in St.
John's recognized the weakness in the NLRB's narrow definition of strictly patient care areas
concluding that, in order to preserve the application of the Board's presumption with respect to
hospitals, the definition of strictly patient care areas must be interpreted to include such places
as halls, stairways, elevators, and waiting rooms accessible to patients. Id. at 1375. See note 38
supra.
The Baptist Hospital Court noted the importance of the definition of "immediate patient
care areas" in determining the scope of the Board's presumption. 442 U.S. at 780. For an
explanation of the definition used by the Baptist Hospital Court, see note 47 supra. Nevertheless, the Court explained that the variety of facilities and techniques for patient care which
exists among hospitals makes any classification by definition difficult. 442 U.S. at 789-90 n.16.
Moreover, the Court pointed out that the "immediate patient care" criterion has been criticized
by the Union and other labor organizations as "simplistic." Id.
87. See St. John's Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1375. The St. John's court
noted that the emphasis in modern hospitals is on enabling the patient to become ambulatory as
soon as possible. Id.
88. For example, a terminally ill patient may be given privileges to visit the first floor areas
in order to improve morale, while a patient with a minor bone fracture, who is otherwise fit,
may be confined to bed. The Tenth Circuit in St. John's was also skeptical of any distinction
drawn on the basis of the physical condition of patients frequenting certain areas. 557 F.2d at
1372.
In support of its position that patients in first floor areas are better able to cope with
disturbance, the Baptist Hospital Court noted that two Hospital witnesses had testified that at
least some types of solicitation in public areas, such as the cafeteria, would be unlikely to affect
those patients present. 442 U.S. at 786. The Court, however, failed to explain, or to give any
examples of, the kinds of solicitation which could be considered innocuous. See id. It is submitted that such speculative evidence is insufficient to overcome the weight of the testimony which
stressed that any disturbance to patients, even pre-operative patients, could adversely affect
patient care. For a discussion of this testimony, see notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra.
89. See 442 U.S. at 788.
90. See, e.g., Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in
part and remanded, 439 U.S. 9 (1978); St. John's Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB,
557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Baylor, see note 39 supra. For a discussion
of St. John's, see notes 27-32 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
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Baptist Hospital Court recognized this weakness, 9 1 yet countered the arguments challenging the rationality of the presumption as applied to all patient
access areas only by pointing to the evidence in the instant case and in Beth
Israel which supported the proposition that solicitation in at least some areas
will not adversely affect patient care. 92 It is submitted that such evidence is
insufficient to support the presumption's rationality because in Baptist Hospital a no-solicitation ban had been in effect and, therefore, any testimony
offered was merely speculative as to what effect solicitation might have on
hospital patients. 93 In Beth Israel, the hospital had seen limited solicitation
in its cafeteria which was used almost exclusively by staff.94 However, it is
contended that this experience, standing alone, is insufficient to support the
Baptist Hospital Court's conclusion that the NLRB presumption is rationally
based, since solicitation in patient access areas frequented by a substantial
95
percentage of patients had never been attempted.
The weakness in the rationality of the Board's presumption is, it is submitted, strong support for the view that the presumption is wholly invalid in
any patient access area. It is suggested that the NLRB has been too eager to
apply the principles and presumptions which evolved in an industrial setting
to hospitals. 9 6 While the health care industry in this country has been
characterized as "big business," 97 a nonprofit hospital's primary concern, unlike that of a profit-oriented industry, is the care of patients. 98 The presence of the patient as a key third party in the labor-management relationship
interjects unique concerns not present in the industrial setting. 99 It is submitted that hospital patients, unlike employers and employees, are not entirely voluntary participants in labor-management struggles 100 and,
moreover, are ill, often in pain, and unquestionably vulnerable. Thus, it is
suggested that their needs must be given greater weight than those of
employees or employers in balancing the rights of all concerned. 101
91. 442 U.S. at 788.

92. Id. at 787-88.
93. Id. at 786.
94. 437 U.S. at 502.
95. For a discussion of the Baptist Hospital Court's analysis of the presumption's rationality
in the hospital setting, see notes 55-63 and accompanying text supra.
96. See 442 U.S. at 792-93 (Burger, C.J., concurring); note 23 and accompanying text supra.
97. As one author noted nearly 10 years ago: "The health industry is big business, profitable
business, and booming business." HEALTH POLICY ADVISORY CENTER, THE AMERICAN
HEALTH EMPIRE: POWER, PROFITS AND POLITICS 95 (1971). In the fiscal year 1974-1975, total
national health expenditures were over $118 billion. Falk, Financing and Cost Controls in Medical Care, in MEDICINE IN A CHANCING SOCIETY 188 (L. Corey, M. Epstein & S. Saltman eds.
1977).
98. See 442 U.S. at 791 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
99. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. Patients in need of hospitalization must either go to the hospital where their physicians
have admitting privileges or else forego hospital treatment by those physicians. Telephone interview with Ms. Frances Serno, Director of Admissions, Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (May 23, 1980).
101. See 442 U.S. at 793 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief justice Burger reasoned that because the primary objective of every hospital is patient care, no evidence is needed to establish
that anything tending to interfere with this objective cannot be tolerated. Id. at 791 (Burger,
C.J., concurring). "A religious choir singing in a hospital chapel may well be desirable [as is
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It is contended that Chief Justice Burger's approach of eliminating the
Board's presumption in all areas "devoted primarily to patient care" provides
a framework that is supported by the realities of patient care in modern
hospitals and strikes an appropriate balance between the needs of patients
and employees. 10 2 Removing the presumption from any area devoted
primarily to patient care does not, it is suggested, mean that a hospital will
be allowed to promulgate a broad no-solicitation rule in all instances, but
only that the NLRB will bear the burden of proving the invalidity of a hospital's rule applicable to those areas.' 0 3 In view of the tenuous support underlying the present presumption, 10 4 it is submitted that this allocation of the
05
burden of proof is better supported by the realities of modern health care. 1
In considering the impact of Baptist Hospital, it is submitted that the
Court's decision did little to clarify the issues surrounding the rights of hospitals to promulgate broad no-solicitation rules in patient access areas. Although the Court indicated that the task of framing a presumption regarding
no-solicitation rules will continue to lie with the NLRB, 10 6 it once again
expressed doubts whether the Board's interpretation of the present presumption, with its narrow definition of immediate patient care areas,
adequately takes into account the realities of modern hospital care. 10 7 Such
an admonition may influence the NLRB to expand the definition of "immediate patient care areas" to include areas adjacent to patient and treat-

access by employees to union solicitation] but if that interferes with patient care, it cannot be
allowed." Id.
102. See id. at 792 (Burger, C.J., concurring). For an explanation of this approach, see note
62 and accompanying text supra. The phrase "areas devoted primarily to patient care" includes
all areas frequented by patients. 442 U.S. at 792 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
103. See 442 U.S. at 792-93 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Under such an approach, gift shops
and cafeterias like those in Beth Israel and Baptist Hospital would normally not qualify as
patient care areas, since a substantial level of patient usage of such facilities would probably not
be demonstrable. See id. at 786; Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at 502. If, however, a
given percentage of patient usage is found to exist in this type of facility, then it should be
deemed a "primary patient care area." Such a clear-cut criterion would, it is suggested, provide
notice to a hospital as to whether solicitation could be banned in these places. Moreover, it is
submitted that when an area achieves a substantial percentage of patient usage, it becomes in
effect a part of the overall patient milieu within which tranquility is essential. For a discussion
of the necessity for tranquility in the patient's overall environment, see notes 75-78 and acconpanying text supra.
It is submitted that this approach is also best suited to meet the needs of 1) modern
hospitals containing ambulatory self-care units in which patients admitted solely for diagnostic
tests are allowed free access to all hospital areas; and 2) general hospitals which also house
short-term care psychiatric facilities in which patients and staff mingle freely as part of a
therapeutic environment. Such an approach would also avoid the dilemma, still plaguing at least
one member of the Court, as to why commercial cafeterias and gift shops are not analogous to
retail establishments for presumption purposes-an issue unaddressed by the Baptist Hospital
majority. See 442 U.S. at 775-91; id. at 791 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
104. For criticism of the basis of the present presumption, see notes 84-101 and accompanying text su pra.
105. See notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra.
106. 447 U.S. at 789.
107. Id.
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ment rooms, or even to adopt the more expansive position suggested by the
St. John's court.' l0
Furthermore, it appears that the issue of the disparate treatment by the
NLRB of retail establishments as distinct from hospital cafeterias and
shops,' 0 9 although not specifically addressed by the Baptist Hospital
Court, 110 may as yet be unresolved. Because the Beth Israel Court emphasized the facts of that case in resolving this issue,"' and because some
justices have questioned this inconsistency, 1 12 it is suggested that the
Board's approach may be successfully challenged in the future on facts
different from those in Beth Israel.
In conclusion, it is submitted that Baptist Hospital illustrates the complexities of labor-management issues in the nonprofit hospital setting where
union organizational activity is now permitted by the National Labor Relations Act. In addition to highlighting the tension between the NLRBwhich must carry out the mandate of the amended Act-and the courtswhich are limited in their scope of review of NLRB decisions-the Baptist
Hospital decision points out the unique issues inherent in the hospital context which may make application of traditional labor rules and presumptions
inappropriate. This decision, unfortunately, resolves few of these issues and
provides little explicit guidance to either unions or employers regarding
permissible solicitation in patient access areas. Thus, further labormanagement conflict, with resultant disruption to patients, appears inevitable in hospital facilities undergoing a union organizational campaign.
Roberta D. Pichini

108. See note 38 supra. The Supreme Court appears to be showing extreme deference to the
NLRB in its formulation of rules and presumptions under the Act. See 442 U.S. at 775-91. An
expansion of the definition of "immediate patient care areas" may serve to "save" the presumption against no-solicitation bans as applied to the hospital setting. Id.
109. For a discussion of this inconsistent application of the Board's presumption, see notes
24-25 and accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 46 & 84 supra.
111. See 437 U.S. at 517 (Powell, J., concurring).
112. See 447 U.S. at 791 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at

517 (Powell, J., concurring). It should be recalled that Justice Powell was joined in his concurrence in Beth Israel by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. See note 46 supra.
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